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COMMENT
PROTECTING NATIONAL FLAGS: MUST THE UNITED
STATES PROTECT CORRESPONDING FOREIGN
DIGNITY INTERESTS?
INTRODUCTION
On a summer day in 1984, Gregory Lee Johnson found his fif-
teen minutes of fame. He burned an American flag outside the Re-
publican National Convention in Dallas and was convicted of vio-
lating a Texas statute that penalizes flag desecration.1 His
conviction was eventually appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.' The resulting June 21, 1989 decision, holding that his con-
viction was unconstitutional, has been derided in the legal3 and
popular4 press.
Mr. Johnson would not have been prosecuted had he burned a
foreign flag instead of the American flag, because no federal or
state statute prohibits the desecration of a foreign flag.' He would
not have been prosecuted under any legal theory, as shown by the
1. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989) provides in full:
Section 42.09 Desecration of Venerated Object
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial, or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, 'desecrate' means deface, damage, or otherwise
physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more
persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense in this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Subdivision (a)(3) was deleted by the 71st Legislature in 1989. The 71st Legislature added
subdivision (d) which provides: "An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree
if a place of worship or burial is desecrated." (Vernon 1990).
2. Texas v. Johnson, - U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
3. See, e.g., James, Term's Decisions on Expression Confound Many, THE NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 21, 1989, at S6.
4. See, e.g, Trippett, A Few Symbol-Minded Questions, TIME, Aug. 28, 1989, at 72;
Editors, The Banner Yet Waves READER'S DIGEST, Sept. 1989, at 49-50.
5. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeal decision in Johnson v. State,' re-
versing his conviction. A footnote7 states that demonstrators burned
an unidentified foreign flag the same day Mr. Johnson was ar-
rested. No one was arrested over that incident, even though "[tlhis
act led to a physical brawl" 8 and Texas has a statute penalizing
breaches of the peace.9
These facts emphasize that, like defilement of the American flag,
acts of defilement toward foreign flags are constitutionally pro-
tected. This proposition is grounded in the Texas court's rationale
concerning respect for American flags:
Recognizing that the right to differ is the centerpiece of our First
Amendment freedoms, a government cannot mandate by fiat a
feeling of unity in its citizens. Therefore, that very same govern-
ment cannot carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a set of
approved messages to be associated with that symbol when it can-
not mandate the status or feeling the symbol purports to
represent.10
This same proposition is found in the Supreme Court's position that
the first amendment protects expressive conduct involving Ameri-
can flags." The Supreme Court's position, combined with the vir-
tual absence of legislative protection of foreign flags, establishes
that persons who defile foreign flags in the United States should
likewise not be penalized.
However, not all members of the world community endorse that
result. Indeed, many states in Europe, Latin America and the Pa-
cific Rim have enacted statutes penalizing acts of disrespect toward
foreign flags. 2 These statutes point to another proposition-that
national governments have a legal obligation 1" to prevent insults to
foreign national dignities, which represent those states' sovereignty
and legal personality.'
6. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
7. Id. at 94 n.3.
8. Id.
9. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01 (Vernon 1989).
10. Johnson v. State, supra note 6, at 97.
I1. Texas v. Johnson, supra note 2, 109 S. Ct. at 2539, citing e.g., Spence v. Washing-
ton, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
12. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
13. An "obligation" is "that which a person is bound to do or forbear." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 968 (5th ed. 1979).
14. A dignity interest arises only when a population entity achieves statehood. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Professors Lauterpacht and Guggenheim write that states have
a legal duty to recognize entities possessing the characteristics of statehood. 1. BROWNLIE,
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This Comment examines the tension between these propositions.
Advocates of a legal obligation preventing foreign dignity insults
argue that disrespect to a foreign flag is also disrespect to the state
it represents. This argument is timely"6 and reasonable. 6 States
that take offense when their flag is insulted in other states may
elect to curtail or terminate diplomatic relations, resulting in a gen-
eral breakdown of peace and security among peoples.1 7 This scena-
rio is antithetical to the United Nations Charter's purposes and
principles. 8
Meanwhile, advocates of the first amendment-based proposition
argue that punishing acts that defile foreign flags conflicts with
constitutional privilege. They contend that the first amendment pro-
tects most expressive conduct, despite dicta upholding dignity inter-
ests 9 and a broadly-worded legal obligation that recognizes the
sovereignty and equality of states.2 Therefore, American jurispru-
dence recognizes, at best, a moral but not a legal obligation to pro-
tect national dignities through flag respect.
This Comment begins by establishing an international legal obli-
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter BROWNLIE1.
However, this legal duty does not require the political (and hence discretionary) act of estab-
lishing diplomatic ties with that state's government, with all the concomitant issues that act
entails. See Memorandum on Legal Aspects of Representation in the United Nations, U.N.
Doc. S/1466 (1950).
15. The media in November 1989 showed Iranian women casting American flags to
the ground to mark the tenth anniversary of seizing the U.S. embassy in Tehran. See, e.g.,
Lacayo, A Game of Winks and Nods, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 65.
16. International incidents involving disrespect to foreign flags are numerous through-
out history. D. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY 2
(1968).
17. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, preamble, opened for signa-
ture Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The United States
signed and ratified the Vienna Convention in 1972 (23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502).
18. U.N. CHARTER, art. I provides:
The purposes of the United Nations are: to maintain international peace and secur-
ity, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conform-
ity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
19. "The law of nations requires every national government to use 'due diligence' to
prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another nation with which it is at
peace, or to the people thereof." United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1886). "Inter-
national law is part of our law." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899). See also
Address by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Normalization of Diplomatic
Relations, at Occidental College (June 11, 1977) reprinted in L. HENKIN, R.C. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 243-44 (2d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS].
20. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 2 provides: "To develop friendly relations among na-
tions based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."
19901
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gation preventing national insults through flag defilement. The next
section analyzes the United States' practice regarding protection of
foreign flags. The Comment concludes that the United States is le-
gally compelled to incorporate the international obligation into its
domestic law, while accommodating the constitutional safeguards
of the first amendment.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION NOT TO INSULT FOREIGN
FLAGS AND DIGNITIES
A. Introduction
Before the United States will enforce an international obligation,
it must first determine that the obligation exists in international
law. Any discussion of international legal materials must start by
identifying the sources of international law. The International
Court of Justice, the judicial organ of the United Nations,21 has
codified the traditional sources as: (a) conventions, (b) international
custom, (c) general principles and (d) "subsidiary means" of judi-
cial decisions and the writings of internationally-recognized au-
thors.22 Other sources may augment this list,2 3 but they have never
gained the same degree of universal acceptance as the list codified
by the Court.2
21. U.N. CHARTER, art. 92 provides: "The International Court of Justice shall be the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the an-
nexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter."
The Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) was created by the League of
Nations in 1922. It dealt with 29 contentious cases and delivered 27 advisory opinions until
World War 11 caused it to remove to Geneva. The San Francisco Conference of 1946 re-
placed the P.C.I.J. with the I.C.J. as the principal judicial organ of the newly-Constituted
United Nations. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 14-18 (3d ed. 1986).
22. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. I [hereinafter Statute
of the I.C.J.] provides in full:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
23. For a criticism of why the activities of international organizations, the doctrine of
ius cogens, or statements appealing to justice or natural law are unlikely valid sources today,
see M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-39 (6th ed.
1987) [hereinafter AKEHURSTI.
24. Id. at 23. See also Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 REC.
DES COURS 60-61 (1982-V) [hereinafter Schachter].
[Vol. 20
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol20/iss2/10
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Some sources of international law are more legally significant
than others. For example, conventions (or treaties) 5 are accorded
more weight than custom (the individual practice by states of what
they understand as legal obligations) when they control particular
issues or declare that they codify existing custom.2" When conven-
tions come into force, they can also override or disregard existing
customs z7 that are either ambiguous or not clearly analogous to the
issue.2" However, emerging customs2e can replace outdated conven-
tions as evidence of international law addressing new issues.3"
Therefore, when they cannot be reconciled, the latter in time is
generally treated as the controlling source of law.
When conventions and custom conflict and neither one disposes
of an issue, another source of international law which may be con-
sidered is general principles.3 " General principles are legal analo-
gies and conclusions drawn from existing conventions and custom. 32
One of their main purposes is to fill gaps left by conventions and
25. Conventions include "law making" treaties, bilateral agreements, and conclusions
of international conferences. See BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 12-15.
26. Codification is "the more precise formulation and systematization of rules of inter-
national law where there already has been extensive state practice, precedent and doctrine."
Schachter, supra note 24, at 91-95. Where existing custom is codified under treaty, those
states that conclude the treaty are bound by the underlying custom. BROWNLIE, supra note
14, at 12-13. For a differing opinion on codification, see R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom,
129 REC. DES COURs 25, 99-101 (1970-1) [hereinafter Baxter].
27. Custom is a "general recognition among states of a certain practice as obligatory."
BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 5. As noted in the Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 22, custom
is a recognized source of international law. It is usually found in official government pro-
nouncements, statutes and case law, all of which demonstrate what that State understands to
be its international legal obligations. See AKEHURST, supra note 23, at 25-34.
28. See, e.g., Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India),
1960 I.C.J. 6 (Merits); G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133-36 (Butler trans.
1974); Baxter, supra note 26.
29. An example of a new custom since the 1950s covers the exploration of outer space.
When a conflict arises over an alleged regional custom, evidence must establish that the
custom binds all states involved in the conflict. See, e.g., Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru),
1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Judgment of Nov. 20).
30. "Desuetude" describes a treaty which has been discontinued or terminated by im-
plication. See BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 614-15; see also AKEHURST, supra note 23, at
40.
31. The International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of
International Justice, have evoked general principles of international law to extrapolate gen-
eral practices in the world community. General principles are more prevalent and more read-
ily accepted in common law states than in civil law states. See AKEHURST, supra note 23, at
35-36.
32. See Virally, The Sources of International Law, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 143-48 (Sorensen ed. 1968). But Schachter cautions theorists from inferring a
general principle too readily from domestic law, because the principle must apply on the
international level and not merely to a handful of states. See Schachter, supra note 24, at
78-80, and BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 16, 19.
1990]
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custom."3
As "subsidiary means,'' 3 one may refer to judicial decisions35
and to the writings of international lawyers. There is little differ-
ence in scholarly value between judicial and arbitral decisions"e and
both can be evidence of international custom.37 International law-
yers provide concise summaries of custom.38 Such writers are com-
monly consulted by the International Court, as well as by domestic
courts that are unfamiliar with technical points of international
law.39
B. Examining The Sources to Find The International
Obligation
1. Conventions
The United States has concluded many bilateral and multilateral
conventions throughout its history.40 Some of the conventions ar-
guably create a "principal obligation"4 for the United States to
prohibit its citizens from insulting foreign states through their flags.
This principal obligation is referenced in the United Nations
Charter, which created an "Organization based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its Members." 4 The doctrine of sover-
eign equality of states is the cornerstone of international law.
4 3
Thus, the principal obligation arising from the United Nations
Charter is that Members are required to respect the sovereignty of
all other Members. A corollary of that obligation is that no Mem-
33. See AKEHURST, supra note 23, at 40.
34. Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 22, art. 38 para. I(d).
35. The International Court of Justice is not bound by stare decisis. Id. art. 59. How-
ever, prior decisions are respected and their rationales may be incorporated into subsequent
decisions. See CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 107-09.
36. See 2 S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 614
(1965); CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 110; AKEHURST, supra note 23, at 244-45.
37. See AKEHURST, supra note 23, at 26.
38. Examples of "the most highly qualified publicists" include treatise authors, reports
and memoranda from the International Law Commission, and Harvard Research drafts.
39. See, e.g., M. Lachs, Teachings and Teaching of International Law, 151 REC. DES
COURS 163-252 (1976-11I).
40. Conventions are incorporated into our domestic law under the Supremacy Clause,
provided that they are ratified by Congress. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. A treaty is considered
a contractual relation with the other signing state(s). However, only self-executing treaties
can supersede inconsistent local laws or create private rights. See Sei Fujii v. State of Cali-
fornia, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29-30
(2d Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
41. "A principal obligation is one which arises from the principal object of the engage-
ment of the contracting parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 970.
42. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. I.
43. BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 287.
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ber may denigrate the sovereign status of another Member,44 which
includes insulting the national flag that represents that Member. In
all these situations, the exercise of international relations is condi-
tioned by law."5
Specific references to the relation between national flags and rep-
resentative sovereignty are found in the Vienna Convention on Dip-
lomatic Relations,"6 signed and ratified by the United States, which
codifies the 1961 United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Inter-
course and Immunities.4 Article 20 of the Vienna Convention
grants a diplomatic mission the right to exhibit its national flag on
the mission premises and on the head of mission's transport.48 Arti-
cle 22, paragraph 1 ensures the inviolability of the mission. Article
22, paragraph 2 obliges the receiving State to prevent impairment
of the mission's dignity: "The receiving State is under a special
duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any distur-
bance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." '49
These provisions were designed to foster "the sovereign equality of
states, the maintenance of international peace and security, and the
promotion of friendly relations among nations.""
Thus, the United States has a principal obligation under both the
United Nations Charter and the Vienna Convention to conduct its
foreign relations so as to promote the sovereign equality of other
parties to these conventions. Because most states are parties to at
least the United Nations Charter,51 the United States has a princi-
pal obligation to respect the sovereign equality, and hence the flag,
of virtually every state on earth.
These principal obligations toward flags are not mere precatory
language. The United States, although not a party to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,52 has submitted through the
44. See, e.g., The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Merits).
45. BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 288.
46. See Vienna Convention, supra note 17.
47. United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Official
Records 1961 (A/CONF. 20/14 & Add. 1).
48. See also Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly
(10th Sess., Apr. 28 - July 4, 1958), reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 78, 94
U.N. Doc. A/3859, A/CN.4/SER. A/1958/Add.l.
49. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, art. 22, para. 2.
50. Id. preamble.
51. The United Nations had 159 members as of mid-1986. CASES AND MATERIALS,
supra note 19, at 340.
52. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39-27 [hereinafter "Law of Treaties"]. For preparatory materials, see
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly (18th Sess., May 4 -
1990]
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State Department that the convention "is already recognized as the
authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." 53 This Con-
vention recognizes that the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (agree-
ments and stipulations of the parties to a contract must be ob-
served) 54 is universally recognized.5 5 The doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda is recognized expressly in Article 26 of the Law of Trea-
ties: "[E/very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith."56
2. International Custom
Customary international law is found primarily in individual
state practice. 57 State practice, as deduced from government pro-
nouncements, statutes and judicial decisions, indicates what those
states understand to be their customary (and hence legal) obliga-
tions under international law.
The International Court of Justice has said that custom depends
on "a constant and uniform usage"5 8 and that state practices
should be as consistent as possible to constitute adequate evidence
of that custom. Major inconsistencies in state practices are evidence
that a dispositive customary rule probably does not exist.
Custom should not be confused with usage. Usage is also a gen-
eral practice of states, but it consists mostly of diplomatic protocol
arising from motives of courtesy, fairness, or morality. Unlike cus-
tom, usage does not create a legal obligation under international
law. 59 Nor is custom based only on the doctrine of opinio iuris.'°
Critically, custom is based on what states say the law is, not what
July 19, 1966), U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1, reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COM'N
173-274, 279-361, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER.A/1966; see also United Nations Conference
on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Official Records, A/CONF. 39/11; Second Session,
A/CONF. 39/11 Add.l.
53. S. Exec. Doc. L. 92d Congress, 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 999; BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at
613.
55. Law of Treaties, supra note 52, preamble.
56. Id. art. 26.
57. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
58. The Asylum Case, supra note 29, at 276-77.
59. A moral obligation binds in conscience but is not enforceable at law. See BROWN-
LIE, supra note 14, at 5, 8.
60. Opinio iuris sive necessitatis ("opinio juris") is a state's belief that it has a legal
duty to act a certain way, premised on an existing rule of international law. This is a subjec-
tive, not an objective, requirement. The International Court requires two conditions to estab-
lish opinio iuris: (I) the act must amount to a settled practice, and (2) the act must evidence
a belief that the act is obligatory under an existing rule. See, e.g., North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.) (W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 45 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
[Vol. 20
8
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol20/iss2/10
FOREIGN DIGNITY INTERESTS
they believe the law to be. 1
Consequently, a custom emerges when some states assert its exis-
tence and other states do not deny its existence. 2 The key to avoid
being bound by a customary rule is for a state to expressly declare
its opposition to the custom, or to act in a way that conflicts with
the custom. Those states that do not either make an express decla-
ration or act contrary to the custom are presumptively bound even
if they did not join in creating the custom."a
An early example of state practice addressing foreign dignity in-
terests comes from Great Britain. In the eighteenth century, West-
minster forbade British subjects to enlist in foreign armies or assist
rebellions against foreign princes.6 4 The official view was that in-
volvement by individual persons constituted insults to foreign
princes, which would then be imputed to Westminster and the only
recourse was war.
6 5
Westminster's anticipation of international incidents has more
recently led other states to enact criminal statutes against any per-
son under their jurisdiction-whether a citizen or an alien-who
insults a foreign flag posted within their territory. The legal obliga-
tion behind these statutes lies in their promulgation and not neces-
sarily in their enforcement. Although enforcement shows consis-
tency within domestic law, evidence of judicial decisions is only a
"subsidiary means" to ascertain international law, assuming no evi-
61. Ordinarily, states are bound when they freely conclude conventions or accept us-
ages that express general principles of law. See, e.g., The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18. This so-called "consensual theory" of international law helps
to explain divergent practices among different states. Otherwise, principles and custom form:
(1) legally enforceable obligations when states are convinced that certain conduct is a duty
(i.e. opinio iuris); or (2) merely permissive rules in the absence of protest by other states.
The subjective intent is not important here; what is critical in determining a legal obligation
is what the state represents as its understanding of the obligation. See, e.g., AKEHURST,
supra note 23, at 29-33.
62. See AKEHURST, supra note 23, at 30. Mere uniformity does not establish the exis-
tence of custom. De Visscher, a former President of the International Court, has written:
"Governments attach importance to distinguishing between custom by which they hold them-
selves bound and the mere practices often dictated by considerations. of expediency and
therefore devoid of definite legal meaning. . . . The inductive reasoning that establishes the
existence of custom is a tied reasoning: the matter is not only one of counting the observed
regularities but of weighing them in terms of social ends deemed desirable." C. DE VISSCHER,
THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 156-57 (Corbett trans. 1968).
63. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 REC. DES COURS 1,
49-53 (1962-11).
64. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States,
22 AM J. INT'L L. 105, 111 (1928) [hereinafter Revolutionary Activities].
65. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 67-78 (1783 ed.
1978).
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dence of custom is established.6"
Europe is one region that has promulgated many statutes
criminalizing disrespect to foreign flags. For example, the Federal
Republic of Germany punishes an insulting act toward a foreign
flag posted at a recognized diplomatic mission, with two years im-
prisonment or a fine.6 7 Other states enact more expansive statutes.
Finland does not require that the flag or symbol be posted in a
specified place, 8 while Norway does not distinguish between the
flags of friendly or hostile states.6 "
Evidence of similar state practice is also found in the Warsaw
Pact. Poland has shown no recent efforts to change its two distinct
and separate anti-flag defilement statutes,70 which are similar to
those statutes promulgated in Western Europe.
Other European statutes incorporate a requirement that diplo-
matic notes must be exchanged between the aggrieved state and the
66. BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 20.
67. Federal Republic of Germany Penal Code § 104 provides in full: "(1) Whoever
removes, destroys, damages, or renders unrecognizable or commits an insulting act with re-
spect to the flag of a foreign state, publicly displayed according to law or recognized usage,
or to a symbol of sovereignty of such a state, publicly installed by a recognized mission of
this state, shall be punished by up to two years' imprisonment or by fine. (2) The attempt is
punishable." THE PENAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, § 104, at 125 (J.
Darby trans. 1987).
Section 104 differs from Section 483 of the Draft Penal Code in that Section 483, para-
graph I also proposed to punish insults to flags of international organizations. This proposal
was dropped when Section 104 was enacted. See THE GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE E. 1962,
§ 483 1, at 252 (N. Ross trans. 1966).
68. Finnish Penal Code ch. 14 § 4 provides in full: "If someone defaces the state seal
or other symbol of power of a friendly state set in a public place, he shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for at most three months." THE PENAL CODE OF FINLAND, ch. 14, § 4, at 51
(M. Joutsen trans. 1987).
69. Norwegian Penal Code § 95 provides in full: "Anybody who, in this country, pub-
licly insults the flag or national symbol of a foreign state, or is accessory thereto, shall be
punished by fine, or jailing or imprisonment up to one year." THE NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE
§ 95, at 50 (H. Schjoldager trans. 1961).
70. The Polish Penal Code art. 284, § I provides in full: "Whoever insults, damages or
removes a publicly displayed emblem, banner, standard, flag, ensign or other symbol of the
Polish State or of an allied State or the symbol of the International Workers Movement,
shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to three years."
Polish Penal Code art. 285 provides in full: "Whoever on the territory of the Polish Peo-
ple's Republic, insults, damages or removes an emblem, a standard, a flag or an ensign of a
foreign State, publicly displayed either by its representation or by order of a Polish State
organ, shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to two years, limitation
of liberty or a fine."
THE PENAL CODE OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC art. 284, § I & art. 285, at 112 (W.S.
Kenny & T. Sadowski trans. 1973).
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offending state before prosecution ensues. 71 Still other statutes in-
corporate a guarantee of reciprocity from the aggrieved state. 2 Fi-
nally, other states incorporate treaty provisions into their statutes. 73
If found only in Europe, these statutes would be evidence of only
a regional custom at best. In that case, the custom could not bind
states outside Europe.74 However, the custom of protecting foreign
flags from insult has been codified throughout the world. Similar
statutes are found in Latin America 5 and the Pacific Rim.76
Despite individual differences, these world-wide statutes are evi-
dence that a comprehensive international custom exists concerning
respect for foreign flags. As the developing states in Africa, Asia
and the Pacific assert themselves more forcefully into the interna-
tional arena, this custom may become more susceptible to change
and variance. As these changes occur, the test of consistency77 will
become more critical. However, in the absence of official declara-
tions or conduct to the contrary, the current custom continues in
force.
71. Turkish Penal Code § 165 provides in full: "Whoever, with the purpose of insult-
ing, removes, tears, or damages or otherwise humiliates, an officially masted flag or emblem
of a foreign country, shall be punished by imprisonment for three months to one year. Insti-
tution of a prosecution is subject to the application of the government concerned." THE
TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE § 165, at 67 (N. Gurelli trans. 1976).
72. Italian Penal Code art. 299 provides in full: "Whoever in the territory of the State
vilifies, in a public place or place open or exposed to the public, the official flag or another
emblem of a foreign State, in use in conformity with the domestic law of the Italian State,
shall be punished by imprisonment for from six months to three years." ITALIAN PENAL
CODE § 300 provides in pertinent part: "The provisions of Articles ... 299 shall apply only
insofar as the foreign law reciprocally guarantees equivalent penal protection to the Head of
the Italian State or the Italian flag. THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE arts. 299-300, at 108
(E.M. Wise trans. 1978).
The Greek penal code likewise requires a reciprocal guarantee. See THE GREEK PENAL
CODE art. 155, at 98 (N.B. Lolis trans. 1973).
73. Austrian Penal Code § 66 provides in full: "He who undertakes one of these acts
against a[nother foreign state or its head becomes guilty of the same felony and shall be
punished in the same manner, insofar as reciprocity is either guaranteed by the laws of that
state or by specific treaties implemented by statute in the Austrian Republic." THE AUS-
TRIAN PENAL ACT § 66, at 43-44 (N.D. West & S.I. Shuman trans. 1966).
74. See BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 10.
75. See, e.g., Colombian Penal Code 88 126, 128 & 132, reprinted in THE COLOMBIAN
PENAL CODE, § 126, at 47, § 128, at 48, § 132, at 48-49 (P. Eder trans. 1967).
76. See. e.g., Korean Criminal Code arts. 109 & 110, reprinted in THE KOREAN CRIM-
INAL CODE arts. 109-10, at 65 (P. Ryu trans. 1960); see also Japanese Criminal Code art.
92, reprinted in THE CRIMINAL CODE OF JAPAN art. 92, at 33 (J.E. de Becker trans. 1918);
Filipino Criminal Code art. 118, example 2, reprinted in 2 L.B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL
CODE art. 118, at 26-27 (12th ed. rev. 1981). The People's Republic of China enacted a new
penal code in 1980. It emphasizes economic rights and little or no civil or political rights.
Hence it does not address the issue of flag desecration. THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (C. Kim trans. 1985).
77. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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3. General Principles of International Law
As stated above,7 8 general principles of international law are
analogized from conventions and custom when those sources do not
control an issue. Even though this Comment has established a legal
obligation from conventions and custom, general principles are use-
ful because they lead to two conclusions about foreign flags.
First, states are legally obliged by conventions and custom to re-
spect other states' sovereign equality. A corollary is the right to
have one's national dignity protected from foreign insults. Second,
national sovereignty and dignity are represented by flags and other
symbols of national identity. Insults to these symbols are insults to
the states they represent.
These two principles further establish the legal obligation at in-
ternational law for states to penalize domestic acts of flag defile-
ment that cause disruption of diplomatic relations, which can lead
to breaches of international peace and security.
4. Writings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists
Two subsidiary means of international law are judicial decisions
and internationally-recognized writings of "publicists.1 79 Because
pertinent opinions by the Permanent Court of Justice and the Inter-
national Court of Justice have been cited throughout the footnotes
of this Comment, the works of international writers deserve sepa-
rate attention here.
Hersch Lauterpacht, an eminent author and editor of interna-
tional works, is not convinced that there is sufficient evidence of a
custom protecting foreign dignities.8 0 He thinks that the responsi-
bility to avoid denigrating foreign sovereignty is a mixture of com-
ity and "purely political factors."8 " This sense of exigency depends
on whether an insulted foreign government elects to use retorsions
or reprisals82 against a state that allows acts of flag defilement to go
unpunished.
Lauterpacht's view goes directly to the type of obligation in-
volved. If dignity interests are governed by usage, then according to
78. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
79. Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 22, art. 38, para. l(d).
80. Revolutionary Activities, supra note 64, at 107.
81. Id.
82. Retorsions and reprisals are forms of self-help to defend against non-military ag-
gression. See, e.g., O.Y. ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTER MEASURES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988); Schachter, supra note 24, at 168.
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Lauterpacht, states have only a moral obligation to prohibit these
acts. In other words, states should not be held accountable to en-
force legal standards if they refuse to, or are unable to, prohibit
such acts.
Lauterpacht's colleague and mentor, Louis Oppenheim,83 be-
lieves that basing state practice of respecting foreign dignities on
usage instead of custom is dispositive that a legal obligation does
not exist. Oppenheim gives the example of traditional maritime
rituals honoring flags of foreign vessels to suggest that state prac-
tice regarding foreign flags is grounded in usage or comity, not le-
gal obligation.84 Other writers do not share Lauterpacht's and Op-
penheim's views on exigency and politics. For example, the United
States Supreme Court has said in dicta 85 that international rela-
tions do not subsist as the arbitrary device of one or two states
without regard for other states. Also, two British scholars have
shown through their research that Lauterpacht's position is not
wholly sound. Ian Brownlie8e argues that international law repre-
sents the ongoing practice of a given number of states. Michael
Akehurst 87 likewise contends that when states consent to bind
themselves by a convention, they are clearly bound by the custom
underlying the convention if it declares it is codifying custom, as in
the case of the Vienna Convention. 8
Furthermore, Oppenheim's example of maritime ceremonials
may be inappropriate in light of comments by Professor Ellery
Stowell, a contemporary of Lauterpacht and Oppenheim, who
wrote extensively on the issue of foreign dignities throughout the
1930s:
By the display of the same ceremonial respect to the flag of the
smallest state as that which is accorded to the mightiest empire,
the equality of the states is proclaimed in the sense that each one
of them is recognized as an independent and sovereign member of
international society.
'To deny ceremonial equality' is to put a state beyond the pale of
83. See 7 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-55 (1970) [hereinafter
WHITEMAN].
84. One such ritual is a courtesy gun salute bestowed by one state's warships upon
another state's warships entering the first state's harbor on an official visit. See I L. OPPEN-
HEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 285 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 7th ed. 1974) [hereinafter
OPPENHEIM].
85. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871).
86. BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 8.
87. AKEHURST, supra note 23, at 26. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
88. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, preamble.
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international intercourse. It is tantamount to a decree of excom-
munication. No wonder then that it is regarded as an act of justi-
fying war. . . .The requirement that the national flag and em-
blems be treated with the utmost respect is one of the few
ceremonial requirements which has survived, superseding many
of the former intricate observances.89
Stowell notes elsewhere that "a generally recognized principle of
international law [is] that the flag and sovereign of a foreign state
should not be insulted or treated with disrespect." 90 Stowell also
believes that this principle is linked with custom to create an una-
voidable legal obligation.9"
Lauterpacht would likely respond by arguing that "respect" for a
foreign flag encompasses a wide range of meanings. 2 These mean-
ings range from non-interference and neutrality in foreign affairs,
to a positive duty to protect another state's dignity interests, ren-
dering the international standard both vague and ambiguous.
Yet even Lauterpacht recognizes an exception to his own rule
that there is no legal obligation to respect foreign dignities. He
writes that a government may suppress a person's acts if those acts
threaten to disturb that state's relations with another state.93 In the
case of another state taking offense and imputing responsibility to
the government, Lauterpacht's exception consumes his rule.
On another point, an American think tank named Procedural As-
pects of International Law ("PAIL") argues that research of for-
eign state practices has no relevance for American foreign policy.9"
A conference sponsored by PAIL in 1983 concluded that it is futile
to study practices of states that do not provide the same constitu-
tional safeguards found in the U.S. Constitution.95 The argument is
that other states can enact statutes curtailing expressive conduct
because they are not restricted by constitutional jurisprudence simi-
lar to ours.
The PAIL argument coincides with a theory belonging to Profes-
sor Lawrence Preuss.96 Preuss surveyed individual state practices
89. E.C. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-80 (1931) (emphasis added).
90. Stowell, Courtesy to our Neighbors, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 101 (1942).
91. Stowell, Picketing of Diplomatic and Consular Premises, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 344-
46 (1938) [hereinafter Picketing].
92. Revolutionary Activities, supra note 64, at 106.
93. Lauterpacht, Boycott in International Relations, 1933 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 125,
128.
94. See Lillich & Hannum, Linkages Between International Human Rights and
United States Constitutional Law, 79 AM J. INT'L L. 158-59 (1985).
95. Id.
96. Preuss, International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda Against Foreign
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concerning international relations, and concluded that weaker
states enact statutes favoring foreign dignities because they fear
retribution from stronger neighbors."7 Preuss found in his survey no
indication that these states believed there was an enforceable legal
obligation."8
Preuss neglects to consider two realities of international practice.
First, relations between states are based on their common consent
as sovereign and equal entities." Second, many former rules of
comity have evolved into rules of customary law,' 00 and protection
of foreign flags is now one of those rules of customary law.
The inconsistent positions raised by these esteemed writers illus-
trate why their works are categorized as only subsidiary sources of
law. Lauterpacht stresses that courts have sufficient reason to avoid
relying on them:
There is no doubt that the availability of official records of the
practices of states and of collections of treaties has substantially
reduced the necessity for recourse to writings of publicists as evi-
dence of custom. Moreover, the divergence of views among writ-
ers on many subjects as well as apparent national bias may often
render citations to them unhelpful.'0 1
C. Summary
The principal obligation to respect the sovereign equality of
states, represented by national flags, is derived from conventions
which specifically protect foreign dignities. States entering into
such conventions have a good faith legal obligation to prevent dese-
cration of these flags.
Individual state statutes show a broad-based custom that respect
for foreign sovereignty is tied directly to respect for foreign flags.
The fact that states enact these statutes indicates that states under-
stand they have a legal obligation to prevent incidents attributable
to themselves.
The difficulty of analogizing clearcut principles and reaching a
consensus among publicists shows that this issue is controversial.
Nevertheless, examination of international sources provides a
States, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 649, 650 (1934).
97. Id. at 649.
98. Id.
99. OPPENHEIM, supra note 84, at 22-23.
100. Id. at 34.
101. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT 24 (1958).
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strong argument that a legal, not merely a moral, obligation does
exist today. This obligation is not recognized and practiced consist-
ently in the United States when the government and courts are con-
fronted with international law issues.
II. THE TASK OF ACCOMMODATING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE ON FLAG RESPECT
A. Introduction
A discussion of the United States' position on foreign flags re-
quires at the outset a brief review of federalism and the doctrine of
separation of powers. United States foreign policy is a product of
federalism because the work of foreign relations is the exclusive do-
main of the federal government.' °2 This is because the several
states never possessed international powers ab initio as did the fed-
eral government,103 due to the American colonies separating from
Great Britain as a unit.' Separation of powers is also a factor for
analysis because, within the federal government, the responsibility
of formulating and enforcing foreign policy has traditionally been
vested in the executive branch. 10 5
B. Incorporation Problems
"International law is part of our law."' 0' This dictum by Justice
Gray in an often-cited 1899 Supreme Court case restated a long-
standing principle of American jurisprudence.107
102. "The Congress shall have Power ... to define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I §
8, cl. 10. The Constitution expressly prohibits the several states from concluding conventions
with foreign governments. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).
103. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra note 102; Henkin, International
Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (1984).
104. Unlike other grants of power, the power to handle foreign affairs does not derive
from the Constitution. It is vested in the federal government as the "national concomitant of
nationality." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra note 102. See also Burnet v.
Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1932).
105. The President is responsible only to the Constitution when handling foreign af-
fairs. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra note 102, at 319-20.
106. The Paquete Habana, supra note 19, 175 U.S. at 700.
107. The early United States government, first under the Articles of Confederation
and later under the 1789 Constitution, knew its survival depended on assuring European
states of its good faith intent to observe international custom. See THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (J.
Jay); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1986). It was this necessity of
securing commercial recognition that first brought the United States into the international
forum. See CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 19, at xii; Henkin, International Law as Law
in the United States, supra note 103, at 1555.
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Despite Justice Gray's dictum, many Americans question the le-
gitimacy of international law as a legal system. 1 8 Critics of inter-
national law as a system point to the absence of a supranational
enforcement power forcing states to comply with its rules."0 9 Critics
also contrast the moral tone of international law with the political
pragmatism that earmarks American jurisprudence." 0 Moreover,
international custom has no counterpart in forming our domestic
law. 1"
Therefore, the conundrum of international law for American ju-
rists is a fundamental issue of jurisprudence. On one hand, conven-
tions are incorporated into federal law under the Supremacy
Clause." 2 On the other hand, these conventions may codify cus-
toms and lead to general principles of international law which con-
flict with other provisions of the U.S. Constitution, or else can be
worded so generally that they should be rejected as void for
vagueness.'"
Nevertheless, the United States is responsible under international
law for incorporating international norms into its domestic law.""
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, every
state is required to incorporate international law and no state can
108. See AKEHURST, supra note 23, at 1-11; CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 19, at
1-2.
109. See AKEHURST, supra note 23, at 2, 5-7.
110. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 222-25 (1961). However, not all inter-
national law is premised on natural law (which is the philosophical foundation for interna-
tional law's perceived appeal to morality). Since the nineteenth century, legal positivism has
taught in international law that laws are artificial constructs that respond to extrinsic needs.
This doctrine is favored today by developing states. Nevertheless, natural law has enjoyed a
rebirth since the Nuremberg trials of the 1940s.
Emich von Vattel tried with uneven success to synthesize natural law and legal positivism.
Vattel greatly influenced early American legal thinkers, and was cited by Justice Bork while
sitting in the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Finzer v. Barry, supra note 107, 798 F.2d at 1457.
Many American perceptions of international law come from Vattel and not from Grotius,
Pufendorf and other "founders of international law." See Shestack, The Rise and Decline of
Human Rights in United States Foreign Policy, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 19, 22-24
(1984); AKEHURST, supra note 23, at 14-15.
American jurisprudence has undergone its own transition from appeals to natural law (the
"oracular theory") to public policy and economic considerations (the "factfinder theory").
See G.E. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION (1988).
111. The idea that nations are both creators and subjects of law is alien to American
legal thought. D'Amato, Book Review, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 742 (1984) (reviewing THE
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOC-
TRINES AND THEORY (R. St. J. McDonald & D. M. McDonald ed. (1983)).
112. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
113. RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, at § 302, comment b.
114. BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 52.
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plead domestic law conflicts as a way to avoid a legal obligation.115
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted this principle: "The law of na-
tions requires every national government to use 'due diligence' to
prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another na-
tion with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof." 1 6
Hence, our courts may take notice of foreign statutes and case
law." 7 Although this notice does not bind federal courts under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' 1 8 these statutes and case law are
often the only available evidence of international law upon which to
base a decision in federal court." 9
The incorporation process also moves in the other direction. A
general principle of international law requires states to amend their
domestic laws to conform with international norms when domestic
laws conflict. 120 Failure to amend or repeal domestic laws that con-
flict with international norms constitutes an international breach
when that failure prevents a state from legally resolving an interna-
tional conflict. 12
C. United States Practice Regarding Protection of Foreign
Flags
1. Federal Statutes
The United States does not have a controlling statute penalizing
desecration of a foreign flag. The only exception is narrowly drawn:
Title 18 U.S.C. section 708122 prohibits use of the Swiss coat of
115. "It should ...be observed that ...a State cannot adduce as against another
State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under inter-
national law or treaties in force." Id. at 36, citing Polish Nationals in Danzig, 1932 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 44, at 24.
116. United States v. Arjona, supra note 19, 120 U.S. at 484.
117. Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch.) 191, 197 (1815).
118. "A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country
shall give notice by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, in determining
foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or
not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's
determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. See
FED R. CRIM P. 26.1. No Federal Rule of Evidence deals with judicial notice of "legislative"
facts. FED, R. EviD. 201, Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 201.
119. See BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 57; see also Oliver, Problems of Cognition and
Interpretation in Applying Norms of Customary International Law of Human Rights in
United States Courts, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 59, 60 (1981).
120. See BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 38.
121. Id.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 708 (1988) provides in full:
Whoever, whether a corporation, partnership, unincorporated company, association,
or person within the United States, willfully uses as a trademark, commercial label,
or portion thereof, or as an advertisement or insignia for any business or organiza-
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arms for advertising. The statute was enacted in 1948 by request of
the State Department.' 23 Section 708 is similar to little-known Pub-
lic Law 84124 enacted by the Third Session of the 58th Congress in
1905. Unfortunately, Public Law 84's legislative history does not
explain why "any foreign nation" was added to the list of those
domestic governmental emblems that shall not be incorporated into
trademark designs.
The Senate has acknowledged that insults to a foreign flag can
cause conflict with that foreign. government:
No American, nor any foreign-born person who enjoys the privi-
leges of American citizenship, should ever look up [to the Ameri-
can flag] without taking pride in the fact that he lives under this
free Government. Hence, it has often occurred that insults to a
flag have been the cause of war; and indignities cast upon it, in
the presence of those who revere it, have often been resented and
sometimes punished on the spot."' 25
This acknowledgement may have prompted Congress to enact 36
U.S.C. section 175, providing courtesies when posting foreign
flags."2 6 Congress, however, did not consider the threat of an in-
sulted foreign state to be overly dangerous to national security, be-
cause the Flag Code127 is only declaratory and carries no penalties
to prevent insults from occurring.'2 8
18 U.S.C. section 970129 purports to imprison or fine persons who
tion or for any trade or commercial purpose, the coat of arms of the Swiss Confed-
eration, consisting of an upright white cross with equal arms and lines on a red
ground, or any simulation thereof, shall be fined not more than $250.00 or impris-
oned not more than six months, or both.
123. See 5 WHITEMAN, supra note 83, at 175-77.
124. Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 5, 33 Stat. 724 (1905) provides that no mark shall be re-
fused as a trademark on account of its nature "unless such mark ...consists of or com-
prises the flag or coat of arms of the United States, or any simulation thereof or of any State
or municipality or of any foreign nations." This Public Law was cited by the Supreme Court
in Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 39 (1906).
125. S. Rep. No. 258, 83d Congress, 1st Sess. 1850 (1953).
126. 36 U.S.C. § 175, para. (c) provides in part: "No person shall display the flag of
the United Nations or any other national or international flag equal, above, or in a position
of superior prominence or honor to, or in place of, the flag of the United States at any place
within the United States or any Territory or possession thereof." 36 U.S.C. § 175 para. (g)
provides in full: "When flags of two or more nations are displayed, they are to be flown from
separate staffs of the same height. The flags should be of approximately equal size. Interna-
tional usage forbids the display of the flag of one nation above that of another nation in time
of peace."
127. 36 U.S.C. §§ 173-178 (1988).
128. Holmes v. Wallace, 407 F. Supp. 493, 496 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 970, para. (a) provides in full: "Whoever willfully injures, damages,
or destroys, or attempts to injure, damage, or destroy, any property, real or personal, located
within the United States and belonging to or utilized by any foreign government or interna-
tional organization, by a foreign official or official guest, shall be fined not more than
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"injure, damage, or destroy" personal or real property belonging to
a foreign government, international organization, or official foreign
guest. However, section 970 does not control whether a person who
desecrates a foreign flag may be imprisoned or fined, because Sec-
tion 970 is a property law, not a foreign relations law. A flag is not
merely a piece of cloth; its value lies in its symbolic-value of repre-
senting a state, according to Texas v. Johnson.130 This rationale
invalidates any application of section 970.
Finally, 18 U.S.C. section 956131 might be construed to punish
conspiracies within the United States that intend to "injure or de-
stroy" foreign governmental property located in foreign states.
However, section 956 does not and should not apply to flags and
emblems for the same reasons that section 970 probably fails.
2. Federal Case Law
No federal court has ruled on the desecration of a foreign flag.
The only possible exception was an 1802 incident in Philadelphia,
where the Spanish minister's flag was torn down "with the most
aggravating insults. ' 132 The Pennsylvania courts considered this act
a triable offense, but no record has survived of any trial or its out-
come."' A similar incident did not involve a flag, but occurred in
1784 when the French consul general was assaulted in Philadel-
phia. 1 34 The court in that case construed the insult to the consul
general's person the same as an insult to the French sovereign, con-
stituting a crime under international law.135
Despite the lack of precedent, three twentieth century federal de-
cisions 36 have ruled on political demonstrations outside diplomatic
missions. The courts' rationales on the issue of protecting foreign
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
130. Texas v. Johnson, supra note 2, 109 S. Ct. at 2548.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 956, para. (a) provides in part: "If two or more persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States conspire to injure or destroy specific property situated
within a foreign country and belonging to a foreign government or to any political subdivi-
sion thereof with which the United States is at peace ... each of the parties to the conspir-
acy shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."
132. See Finzer v. Barry, supra note 107, 798 F.2d at 1456; 4 J. MOORE. A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 658, at 627 (1906).
133. Id.
134. Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (I Dall.) 110 (Pa. 1784).
135. "Whoever offers violence to [public ministers] not only affronts the sovereign he
represents but also hurts the common safety and well-being of nations-he is guilty of a
crime against the whole world." Id. at 116.
136. Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Finzer v. Barry, supra
note 107, and Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
[Vol. 20
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol20/iss2/10
FOREIGN DIGNITY INTERESTS
dignities indicate how a case might be decided involving an attack
on a state's flag, instead of its mission.
In Frend v. United States,137 appellants were convicted under a
federal statute s8 prohibiting the display of flags or banners in-
tended to bring a foreign government into "public odium," within
500 feet of that government's mission. Appellants had protested
outside the German and Austrian embassies in Washington. The
court upheld the convictions, stating that Congress' power to define
and punish offenses under international law required Congress to
take "every reasonable precaution" to prevent foreign missions
from experiencing public disrepute. 3 9 The statute did not violate
constitutional due process because Congress reasonably exercised
its police power."'
In Frend the court recognized that our Government is required
under international law to prevent persons from insulting states. If
the insult came from protests outside the mission, a similar insult
would have arisen from burning a German or Austrian flag. Unfor-
tunately, Frend is not dispositive on the issue because the court was
more interested in discussing Congress' police power than in defin-
ing the obligation to protect foreign dignities.
Almost fifty years after Frend, the same D.C. Circuit decided
Finzer v. Barry."' Finzer's facts are similar to Frend's except that
the protests occurred outside the Soviet and Nicaraguan missions.
Finzer disregarded Frend's holding, citing the growth of first
amendment law since Frend was decided." 2
In writing for the majority, Justice Bork did not avoid the diffi-
culty of accommodating international obligations with the require-
ment of upholding the first amendment. He affirmed the convictions
and found that the international obligations were compatible with
the first and fourteenth amendments. 43 To emphasize the impor-
tance of the international obligation, he wrote:
First, shielding government officials from public protest is incom-
patible with our democratic structure, which relies on public criti-
cism as a means of promoting responsive government. Foreign
137. 100 F.2d 691.
138. D.C. Law §§ 22-1115, 22-1116, repealed by D.C. Law 7-105 § 2, 35 D.C.R. 728,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4381 (Michie Supp. 1989).
139. 100 F.2d at 692-93.
140. Id. at 693.
141. 798 F.2d 1450.
142. Id. at 1545.
143. Id. at 1463.
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ambassadors, in contrast, have no similar obligation to be accessi-
ble to public attack, and our policy does not have the same inter-
est in ensuring that they are. Second, we cannot ignore the fact
that American diplomats living overseas are always to some de-
gree at risk. The perception abroad that our government is dimin-
ishing the protection accorded the embassies to whom we are host
would, we are told, seriously compound that risk. Finally, and
most fundamentally, we face here a question of living up to our
obligations under international law and a treaty. These consider-
ations distinguish the issues presented here from those involving
protests in front of the White House, the Capital, and the Su-
preme Court."'
He then discussed the issue of accommodation:
The obligations of the United States under international law, re-
affirmed by treaty, do not, of course, supersede the first amend-
ment. Neither, however, has it ever been suggested that the first
amendment is incompatible with the United States' most basic
obligations under the law of nations. The two must be accommo-
dated. . . .What has been done through [D.C. Code] section 22-
1115 is to give first amendment freedoms the widest scope possi-
ble consistent with the law of nations.14
Chief Justice Wald's vigorous dissent denied that a foreign dig-
nity interest is compelling enough to override first amendment pro-
tections."" The dissent specifically argued that the issue of tearing
down a foreign flag is an issue of protecting the mission's physical
security, and not an issue of protecting the sending state's
dignity.' 47
The value of Finzer is Justice Bork's effort to accommodate in-
ternational law and the first amendment. The quoted passage shows
his unequivocal position that neither international law nor the first
amendment can supersede the other. In an appropriate case, the
trier of fact must form a marriage between the two obligations,
provided they do not conflict.
Finzer was appealed to the Supreme Court in Boos v. Barry"8
and overturned on other grounds.' 49 The appeal and reversal were
probably based on Justice Bork's "deviation"'' 50 from traditional
144. Id. at 1462 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 1463 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 1484.
147. Id. at 1482 n.6.
148. Boos v. Barry, supra note 136.
149. Id. at 1162.
150. Comment, Abridgements of Free Speech Which Discriminate on the Basis of
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first amendment analysis by concentrating on the speech's content
instead of its inflammatory effect.
In Boos, the Supreme Court acknowledged the United States'
interest in protecting the dignity of diplomatic agents. 51 However,
in writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor considered the dignity
standard so inherently subjective as to be inconsistent with the
Court's traditional position of not restricting speech simply because
the audience is affected negatively. 5 Justice O'Connor commented
on the difficulty of accommodating international law and the first
amendment:
[I]t is well-established that 'no agreement with a foreign nation
can confer powers on the Congress, or on any other branch of
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitu-
tion.' [Citations] ...
[T]he fact that an interest is recognized in international law does
not automatically render that interest 'compelling' for purposes of
First Amendment analysis.15
Justice O'Connor decided not to discuss whether a dignity interest
could ever be compelling, but focused instead on the controlling
D.C. statute's faulty drafting. 54 Her only other comment on Jus-
tice Bork's efforts at accommodation was that the United States
does have a "vital national interest in complying with international
law."15
Based on the foregoing, the federal judiciary has recognized the
dignity issue but has not clearly defined how to accommodate inter-
national law and the first amendment. The analogous issue of for-
eign flags is thus unresolved under common law.
3. The State Department and Diplomacy
The lack of legal prohibitions against desecration of foreign flags
does not mean such desecration never happens. Americans have
burned or otherwise desecrated foreign flags during periods of pro-
test, beginning in 1802."' Following some of the resulting interna-
tional incidents, the State Department has responded to the ag-
Viewpoint: Finzer v. Barry, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 127, 142 (1986).
151. Boos v. Barry, supra note 136, 485 U.S. at 323.
152. Id. at 322.
153. Id. at 324.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 323.
156. See, e.g., supra note 132 and accompanying text.
1990]
23
Phillips: Protecting National Flags: Must the United States Protect Corresp
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
grieved states by only issuing a formal apology.'57
The most notable apologies occurred in the 1930s and 1940s and
involved the swastika flag of Nazi Germany. In March 1932, an
American torched the flag flying over the German consulate in St.
Louis.' 58 In July 1935, a minor government official removed the
flag from a German merchant vessel, the S.S. Bremen, when it
anchored in New York harbor. 5 ' In January 1941, unknown per-
sons tore the flag from the German consulate in San Francisco.'60
On each occasion, the German government registered a formal pro-
test under a 1922 convention concluded between the Weimar Re-
public and the United States.' 6 ' On each occasion the State De-
partment formally apologized.'62
The State Department apologized because these incidents were
controlled by a principal obligation' 63 arising from a bilateral con-
vention. However, other flag-related incidents are not controlled so
clearly. They usually are resolved by negotiation before they esca-
late into international incidents.' 6 ' Formal apologies have also
avoided threatened lawsuits for slander and libel.'6 5
Other conflicts have arisen in the opposite context, where Ameri-
can flags are desecrated overseas. On some occasions, desecration is
timed to protest official visits by American leaders or occurs during
periods of internal strife.' 6 Each time the State Department reiter-
157. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
158. Picketing, supra note 91, at 345.
159. 2 G.H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 129, at 145 (1941)
[hereinafter HACKWORTH].
160. 5 WHITEMAN, supra note 83, at 174-75. An American sailor was subsequently
court martialed, but it is not clear on what grounds he was convicted. Id.
161. Id.
162. in response to the Bremen incident, the State Department answered through an
undersecretary: "it is unfortunate that, in spite of the sincere efforts of the police to prevent
any disorder whatsoever, the German national emblem should, during the disturbance which
took place, not have received that respect to which it is entitled." (Aug. 1, 1935). Wilson,
Respect for National Flag, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 662, 663 (1935).
163. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., 5 WHITEMAN, supra note 83, at 175. An example is a series of negotia-
tions between the People's Republic of China and the United Sates in 1958. The PRC in-
tended to issue a postage stamp to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the joint Chinese-
American reconstruction efforts following World War II. The proposed stamp design de-
picted the national flags of both the PRC and the United States, but in disproportionate
sizes. After a series of communications, the final design showed both flags with equal respect.
165. Stowell, The General Smedly D. Butler Incident, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 321, 323
(1931). "Patriotism alone should prevent further comment of a nature to increase interna-
tional resentment. No good citizen will add to the difficulties of the government when it is
obligated to make amends for an offense for which, under international law, the whole nation
is responsible." Id.
166. In May 1958, the Peruvian government apologized to then-Vice President Nixon
after anti-American factions tore up an American flag in front of local police. 5 WHITEMAN,
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ates its position that diplomatic incidents should be prevented by
observing local flag laws.167 However, local laws are sometimes
thrown into upheaval during periods of civil unrest, 168 and the State
Department insists that local authorities respect both the economic
and dignity interests represented by persons posting the American
flag. 169
D. Summary
American lawyers contend with fundamental issues of jurispru-
dence whenever they try to accommodate international law and the
first amendment into a cohesive system. These difficulties and con-
fusions may explain why the Congress has not enacted a statute
prohibiting desecration of foreign flags.
The courts have grappled with issues of accommodation, but to
date there has been no decision on whether to punish an act defiling
a foreign flag. This judicial silence may be due in part to the lack
of legislative guidance.
The State Department responds to some diplomatic crises arising
from flag desecration by issuing formal apologies. American diplo-
mats also elect to negotiate some local problems before they esca-
late. However, these incidents are handled on an ad hoc basis; they
are insufficient evidence that the United States consistently prac-
tices a customary obligation at international law.
CONCLUSION
This Comment illustrates that, in terms of protecting national
flags, the domestic law of the United States on foreign dignity in-
terests is hazy at best. Jurists struggle alongside diplomats to ac-
commodate both international legal obligations and first amend-
ment safeguards for expressive conduct.
The conclusion that foreign flags in the United States are some-
supra note 83, at 178. The Panamanian foreign minister apologized in November 1959 when
the American flag at the United States embassy in Panama City was vandalized. Id. at 179.
The Venezuelan foreign minister apologized when pro-Cuban demonstrators burned an
American flag in front of the Venezuelan Congress building in Caracas. Id. at 180-81.
167. See HACKWORTH, supra note 159, § 127, at 128.
168. Official use of the American flag in foreign states is distinguished in this case
from long-time usage that a national flag denotes foreign ownership of property. Long-time
usage, especially in unstable circumstances, is a practical necessity not to be discarded
quickly. 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 132, at 140. But the
American flag should not be posted by non-American citizens seeking protection under those
circumstances. Id. at 137.
169. Id. at 139.
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how entitled to more protection from desecration than American
flags does not turn the first amendment on its head. Instead, it is a
conclusion that reflects a political awareness American leaders have
known since the Articles of Confederation were in place: we live in
an interdependent world where the practices of other states cause
us to examine our own practices.
This is not to say that accommodation comes easily. Given the
controversy over the Flag Protection Act of 1989, v0 a new federal
statute or constitutional amendment is not likely. The clearest op-
portunities for accommodation come from the courts and the State
Department. The courts should accept a test case and implement
Justice Bork's accommodation rationale. Similarly, the State De-
partment should establish consistent guidelines preventing incidents
as well as resolving them when they arise. In the meantime, this
Comment follows the majority's exhortation in Texas v. Johnson:
"the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.11 7 1
Mark C. Phillips*
170. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (West Supp.
1990).
171. Texas v. Johnson, supra note 2, 109 S. Ct. at 2547.
* This Comment is dedicated with love to my wife, Pamela, a passionate world trav-
eler; and with respect to Professor Howard D. Berman, an unwitting mentor.
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